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RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AS 
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE AND SELF-DECEPTION 
Merold Westphal 
Religious experience can be defined as self-transcendence. Models of this 
decentering of the self are not found in the transcendence of intentionality or 
in either contemplative or ecstatic self-forgetfulness, since all these leave the 
self as center. While they play important roles in authentic religion, experi-
ence that does not get beyond them is self-deceived and ultimately idolatrous. 
Only in the ethical claim that places limits on my will to be the center do I 
encounter the truly other. Even here the form of true religion may assist 
self-deception about the presence of its substance. 
Perhaps you've heard those lemonade ads that refer to the good old days 
when we listened to baseball games on the radio. That part reminds me of 
my own conversion-to lifetime membership in the Diehard Cubs Fan Club. 
Every summer afternoon, as I sat in front of my grandmother's floor model 
radio, Bert Wilson would preach the good news, "We don't care who wins, 
as long as it's the Cubs." And in spite of the fact that in good years they only 
managed to beat out the Pirates for seventh place, I became a true believer. 
But when the lemonade ad suggests that it's "sorta cheatin'" to watch baseball 
on television, I am reminded of something quite different. It was my sopho-
more year in college and one of the most gifted students I have ever known, 
whose specialty was the oral interpretation of literature, was giving his senior 
speech recital. Like an ancient Greek rhapsode, and all in a little under an 
hour, he gave us Doctor Zhivago. For all its visual splendor, like televised 
baseball, the movie version that I was to see later did not surpass this old-
fashioned oral version in dramatic power. The concluding line, taken from 
one of Pasternak's poems, was utterly shattering and unforgettable. "To live 
life to the end is no childish task." 
Kierkegaard expresses this same conviction that life is the task of a lifetime 
by satirizing those for whom most of life is supposed to consist in living 
happily ever after. For such, "when they have arrived at a certain point in 
their search for truth, life takes on a change. They marry, and they acquire a 
certain position, in consequence of which they feel that they must in all honor 
have something finished, that they must have result. .. And so they come to 
think of themselves as really finished ... Living in this manner, one is relieved 
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of the necessity of becoming executively aware of the strenuous difficulties 
which the simplest of propositions about existing qua human-being involves" 
(1941: 78-79; cf. 1980: 55-56). 
By arguing that such persons are strangers to religion, no matter how 
orthodox or pious, Kierkegaard suggests that this enduring adult task has 
religious import. But what is this task, which is the sine qua non of religion, 
and from which, apparently, only death can release us? The Augustinian 
tradition, to which Kierkegaard belongs, is united in its answer: self-transcen-
dence. This is why Augustine speaks of the incarnation as the means by which 
Jesus "might detach from themselves those who were to be subdued and bring 
them over to Himself, healing the swelling of their pride and fostering their 
love so that instead of going further in their own self-confidence, they should 
put on weakness ... should cast themselves down upon that divinity which, 
rising would bear them up aloft" (1963: 155). From this perspective follows 
the Augustinian beatitude: "Blessed is the man who loves you, who loves his 
friend in you, and his enemy because of you" (79). 
Thomas Merton gives the same answer when he writes, "We do not detach 
ourselves from things in order to attach ourselves to God, but rather we 
become detached/rom ourselves in order to see and use all things in and for 
God" (1972: 21). 
Gabriel Marcel puts the point on the horizontal plane in describing the 
nature and difficulty of admiration, "whose enormous spiritual and even 
metaphysical significance is still not recognized. The verb lift forcefully and 
accurately denotes the kind of effect admiration evokes in us, or rather real-
izes in us as a function of the object which evokes it. .. It is clear that the 
function of admiration is to tear us away from ourselves and from the thoughts 
we have of ourselves ... Not so long ago a dramatist affirmed during an inter-
view that admiration was for him a humiliating state which he resisted with 
all his force ... An analysis similar to the one Scheler has given of resentment 
should disclose that there is a burning preoccupation with self at the bottom 
of this suspicion [of anything superior], a 'but what about me, what becomes 
of me in that case?' ... To affirm: admiration is a humiliating state, is the same 
as to treat the subject as a power existing for itself and taking itself as a 
center. To proclaim on the other hand, that it is an exalted state is to start 
from the inverse notion that the proper function of the subject is to emerge 
from itself and realize itself primarily in the gift of oneself' (1964: 47-49). 
Finally, as if to exhibit the agreement between Protestant and Catholic 
Augustinians on this point, we can return to Kierkegaard himself. His defi-
nitions of the self and of faith spell out his understanding of self-transcen-
dence as the lifelong task of life. The self is "a relation that relates itself to 
itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another" (1980: 13-14). 
This latter relation is faith when "in relating itself to itself and in willing to 
170 Faith and Philosophy 
be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it" (49; cf. 
14,30,82, 131). 
Augustine and Merton introduce the basic notion of becoming detached 
from ourselves. Marcel makes it clear that this involves the transition from 
a self preoccupied with itself and its position as the center to a self capable 
of giving itself in admiration and creative fidelity to another. From the point 
of view of the point of departure, this is a humiliating tearing away from that 
to which I cling with all my might. From the point of view of the destination, 
this is a liberating elevation above the narrow horizons defined by the ques-
tion, But what about me? In short, self-transcendence is the journey from the 
false self to the true self, with all of its agony and its ecstasy. 
In spite of its austere from, Kierkegaard's formula for faith recapitulates 
these themes and introduces another. First, with Augustine and Merton he is 
explicit that we are to be detached from ourselves in order to be attached to 
God. 'Freedom from' is in the service of 'freedom for.' Here we encounter 
the wonderful ambiguity of the term 'transcendence.' It can mean that which 
is beyond, the transcendent. Or it can mean going beyond, transcending. For 
the Augustinian tradition the two are united, and transcending is toward the 
transcendent. What is beyond my false self is not simply my true self, but 
the not-myself in proper relation to which it first becomes possible for me to 
be my true self. Only by losing myself, in the sense of going beyond myself 
toward the not-myself, do I ever truly find myself. 
Second, with Marcel, Kierkegaard is explicit that the relation to the other 
is a humble, decentering relation. (This is why it is experienced by pride as 
humiliation.) Self-transcendence means willing to be myself while at the 
same time willing to let God be God, that is, willing to be myself without 
insisting on being God. It is the exact opposite of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, 
who says, "if there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! Hence 
there are no gods" (1966b: 86, "Upon the Blessed Isles"). It means learning 
to pray 
Hallowed by Thy name 
Thy kingdom come 
Thy will be done 
without surreptitiously co-opting the name and the kingdom so that my will 
may be done on earth and in heaven. 
Finally, for all of its emphasis on the role of the transcendent in self-tran-
scendence, Kierkegaard's account explicitly links relation-to-an-other to self-
relation. Only as self-relating selfhood does the self transcend itself toward 
its true self in relation to the transcendent. Given the historical linkage of the 
Augustinian dubito to the Cartesian cogito, this introduction of inwardness 
should not take us by surprise. Among its most important implications is that 
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the metaphor of organic development can never be more than a metaphor, 
and a rather poor one at that, for self-transcendence. The latter presupposes 
too much in the way of self-awareness and self-involvement (Evans, 1963). 
On the other hand, by making self-presence itself a task rather than an 
achievement, Kierkegaard excludes that total self-presence by virtue of which 
the self could claim to be the center. This expresses the great gulf fixed 
between his Augustinianism and its modern, secular counterpart, the Carte-
sian-Humean (Husserlian-positivist) tradition. In its self-relation the self is 
not posited as the ground of certainty, the criterion of truth, the self-sufficient 
and absolute mode of being, in short, the center. If I may be permitted to 
express the point oxymoronically, to counter Cartesian modernity's arrogant 
Augustinianism, Kierkegaard develops the inwardness of a decentered Car-
tesianism. The I of the Augustinian "I think" is always a problem, never a 
possession nor an Archimedean pou sto. 
Having given this somewhat extended Augustinian definition of self-tran-
scendence, I now want to suggest that we use it as at least a working definition 
of religious experience. Religious experience =df self-transcendence, the self-
aware, self-involving, self-transforming relation to the ultimately transcen-
dent. While I believe this definition has advantages at the descriptive level 
for the phenomenological and historical study of religion, the present essay 
will focus on its prescriptive employment as a norm for distinguishing au-
thentically religious experience from its look alikes. Not all the beliefs, prac-
tices, and feelings that are easily recognized as religious are acts of 
self-transcendence. Prayer, for example, can easily be "a burning preoccupa-
tion with self," a solemn repetition of the question, "But what about me, what 
becomes of me in that case?" 
AIterity is a big topic among philosophers these days, and a number of 
contemporary conversations have reminded us how difficult it is for the 
human spirit to be "at home [bei sich] with itself in its otherness as such" 
(Hegel, 1949: 790, my italics; cf. Taylor, 1987). This formula of Hegel's is 
strikingly similar to Kierkegaard's designation of faith as a self-relating that 
is simultaneously an other-relating. Its "as such" is meant as a reminder that 
the other is meant to remain other. But for all his emphasis on dialectic as 
the path of otherness, opposition, negation, contradiction, and so forth, Hegel 
himself stands accused of taking away with dialectical reconciliation what 
he first gives in the form of dialectical difference. Dialectic turns out to be 
a monological self-mediation rather than a dialogical other-mediation 
(Habermas, 1987 and Desmond, 1987). 
In a similar vein, Derridean deconstruction, flying significantly under the 
banner of differance, is a sustained polemic against the metaphysics of pres-
ence precisely as the reduction of the different to the same. The debate with 
Gadamer, for example, can perhaps best be summarized as the reciprocal 
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claims, I am more open to otherness than you are (Michelfelder and Palmer, 
1989; cf. Caputo, 1987). 
These discussions provide an important context for any contemporary dis-
cussion of religious experience as self-transcendence. What is more, reflec-
tion on specifically religious experience can make an important contribution 
to the wider discussion of otherness in general. For, in the first place, the 
holy, the ultimately transcendent, has appropriately been designated, not 
merely as other but as "wholly other." It is quintessentially transcendent. 
Secondly, self-transcendence may be more than casually linked to the tran-
scendent; it may well be the condition and measure of the transcendent. This 
would mean, not that there is the transcendent only to the degree that we are 
able to transcend ourselves, but that we experience the transcendent as such, 
as truly other, only to the degree that we are able to transcend ourselves. 
Conversely, to the degree that self-transcendence fails, transcendence is only 
apparent, that is, idolatrous. 
In order to explore this hypothesis and to clarify the normative significance 
of the concept of religious experience as self-transcendence, I want to look 
at a variety of other modes of experience in order to highlight the tenuousness 
of transcendence in them. The claim that knowledge is self-transcendence is 
an good point of departure both because religion is so often identified with 
religious beliefs and because philosophers so often speak of knowledge as 
transcendence. For example, Fichte says that "the I forgets itself in the object 
of its activity ... Intuition is the name of this action, a silent, unconscious 
contemplation, which loses itself in its object" (Breazeale, 1988: 260). 
Kojeve expands on this idea. "Now, the analysis of 'thought,' 'reason,' 'un-
derstanding,' and so on-in general, of the cognitive, contemplative, passive 
behavior of a being or a 'knowing subject' -never reveals the why or the 
how of the birth of the word T '" The man who contemplates is 'absorbed' 
by what he contemplates; the 'knowing subject' 'loses' himself in the object 
that is known. Contemplation reveals the object, not the sUbject. .. The man 
who is 'absorbed' by the object that he is contemplating can be 'brought back 
to himself' only by a Desire" (1969: 3). In other words, in desire we are 
related to the other, for example, something we want to eat, only as the mode 
in which we are preoccupied with ourselves and satisfying our needs; but in 
cognition real transcendence occurs as we lose ourselves and become ab-
sorbed in the object. 
Since Husserl treats intentionality primarily as cognitive, his claim that 
intentionality is transcendence can help us make this claim more precise. In 
the first place there is the transcendence of the physical object to perception. 
It is transcendent by virtue of exceeding whatever it is able to give of itself 
"in person," whatever is directly present to perception. It can present its front 
side, but not its other sides. It can only present itself in adumbrations 
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(abschattungen) which it always infinitely exceeds (1983: par. 41-42). In this 
way the object transcends the perception of it. 
Other objects, such as mental processes (Erlebnisse) are not given in this 
way. "Ein Erlebnis shattet sich nicht ab." For this reason there is a sharp 
distinction to be drawn between a mental process and a physical thing (Ding), 
namely that the former "can be perceived in an immanental perception," 
while the latter is always transcendent (par. 42). 
There are also nonspatial objects that have their own mode of transcen-
dence. In reflection my intentional object is a cogitatio, one of my own, and 
we might label this "internal perception." But Husserl prefers the language 
of immanence and transcendence to that of internal and external. So he says 
that "by intentive mental processes related to something immanent, we un-
derstand those to which it is essential that their intentional objects, if they 
exist at all, belong to the same stream of mental processes to which they 
themselves belong ... lntentive mental processes of which that is not the case 
are directed to something transcendent" (par. 38, his italics). This means that 
my cognition is transcendent whenever it is directed to an "object" that is not 
a cogitatio or Erlebnis of my own. Among such objects are not only spatial 
objects but essences, other egos, and their Erlebnisse. 
This seems to be very close to the realism of G. E. Moore, grounded in the 
distinction between the act and the object of consciousness (1953: ch. XVI 
and 1959: ch. I-II). Given the way in which both Moore and Husserl distin-
guish the intentional object (noema) from the act that intends it (noesis), it 
is not clear why we shouldn't say that every intentional act involves tran-
scendence. Whether or not that is what they intend us to conclude, we can 
distinguish three theses about intentionality and transcendence: 
1) We encounter transcendence in every intentional object (since the act 
and the object can always be distinguished). 
2) We encounter transcendence in those intentional objects which are not 
themselves our own cogitationes or Erlebnisse (since they do not belong 
to the stream of mental acts that includes the acts that intend them). 
3) We encounter transcendence in those intentional objects that are physi-
cal, i.e., spatial (since they can only give themselves partially, per-
spectivally, abschattungsweise). 
No doubt each of these theses embodies a legitimate and useful concept of 
transcendence. But none of them gives us the self-transcendence we are 
looking for, that detachment from self that moves us beyond preoccupation 
with what Kant calls "the dear self." 
The first reason for this is clear if we return briefly to Kojeve. The sepa-
ration of cognition from desire that he attributes to the knowing subject is by 
no means typical of cognition. Hume, the father of positivism, says, "Reason 
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is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to 
any other office than to serve and obey them" (1888: 415). Nietzsche, the 
father of postmodernism, agrees: "but reason is merely an instrument, and 
Descartes is superficial" (1966a: 104). If we think of positivism and 
postmodernism as diseases to be eliminated like polio and smallpox, the best 
we can hope to do is show that Hume and Nietzsche are not right all of the 
time. We would surely be kidding ourselves to deny that they are right at 
least most of the time. And whether instrumental reason is to be seen as the 
glory or the curse of modernity, it is nothing if not preoccupation with the 
self (personal and collective) and its desires. 
But, it may well be objected, did not Fichte and Kojeve speak explicitly 
about contemplation, making it clear they have disinterested cognition in 
mind? The Greeks and their modem followers often speak of philosophy as 
theoria in this sense, but at least since the eighteenth century the notion of 
disinterested contemplation has primarily been developed in relation to aes-
thetic experience. A tradition that extends from Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, 
Burke, and Alison through Kant and Schopenhauer to Croce and Edward 
Bullough has sought to make the transcendence of self-interest the key to 
aesthetic appreciation (see Westphal, 1984: 131-35). The anti-instrumental, 
anti-utilitarian theme of this tradition is succinctly expressed by C. S. Lewis, 
"the many use art and the few receive it" (1961: 19), and by Oscar Wilde, 
"All art is quite useless" (1981: xxiv). 
The examples Shaftesbury gives of disinterested contemplation make it 
clear that breaking the link between intentionality and desire is the heart of 
the matter. It is the absence of the desire to command, the desire to own, the 
desire to eat, and the desire to touch sexually that makes the perception of 
beauty disinterested, and Shaftesbury understandably speaks of this as the 
transcendence of "selfishness," "self-interest," and "self-love" (1964: II, 126-
28, I, 78, 274-75, 317). 
There can be little doubt that in theoretical and aesthetic contemplation we 
have the self-forgetfulness Fichte and Kojeve have in mind, in which the 
subject sinks from sight, playing at most the role of background or horizon 
while the object becomes foreground and theme. If we remember that 
Shaftesbury's primary interest in disinterestedness was not aesthetics but 
ethics and religion, we may think that we have found what we are looking 
for (cf. O'Connor, 1972: 151-52). But this model is also too weak. 
Contemplative self-forgetfulness takes us beyond instrumental reason, to 
be sure. Hume and Nietzsche might deny that it ever exists, and we would 
do well to take their suspicions seriously. But let us retain the hypothesis that 
it sometimes does occur, at least to a significant degree. The problem begins 
with Aristotle, whose Metaphysics begins with the words, "All men by nature 
desire to know." It looks as if the link between knowledge and desire has not 
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been cut after all. Of course, the desire to know is not a selfish desire, as if 
knowledge were a zero sum game. But it is, even when it has no instrumental 
significance, the desire to satisfy and fulfill the self. To use a Rawlsian 
distinction (1971: 127-29), it is a desire both of the self (my desire) and in 
the self (for my satisfaction). For this reason, Aristotle's ethics, including his 
theory of contemplation as an intellectual virtue, is properly identified as a 
self-realization theory. 
Shaftesbury points us in the same direction. "For though the habit of self-
ishness and the multiplicity of interested views are of little improvement to 
real merit or virtue, yet there is a necessity for the preservation of virtue, that 
it should be thought to have no quarrel with true interest and self-enjoyment" 
(1964: 274). The point is not that self-realization and self-enjoyment are evil. 
It is simply that contemplative experience, theoretical or aesthetic, that is 
properly interpreted in these terms can hardly be a convincing model for 
religious experience conceived as detachment from self. Disinterestedness 
may delimit but it does not displace the supremacy of the self, which remains 
the horizon for contemplative self-forgetfulness. Conversely, if religious ex-
perience is to be conceived as self-transcendence, any piety that does not get 
beyond both instrumental self-seeking and contemplative self-enjoyment is 
not genuine religious experience. 
C. S. Lewis fails to see this point in an otherwise illuminating discussion 
of heaven in The Problem of Pain. People are nervous about "pie in the sky" 
escapism, he notes. But if there is no "pie in the sky" then Christianity is 
false, and if there is, then we must deal with it. He writes, "we are afraid that 
heaven is a bribe, and that if we make it our goal we shall no longer be 
disinterested. It is not so. Heaven offers nothing that a mercenary soul can 
desire. It is safe to tell the pure in heart that they shall see God, for only the 
pure in heart want to." With the right kind of glosses on these claims Lewis 
could take us beyond disinterestedness to genuine transcendence. But instead 
of doing so he remains within the dichotomy of disinterested and mercenary. 
"There are rewards that do not sully motives. A man's love for a woman is 
not mercenary because he wants to marry her, nor his love for poetry merce-
nary because he wants to read it, nor his love of exercise less disinterested 
because he wants to run and leap and walk. Love, by definition, seeks to 
enjoy its object" (1962: 144-45). By being satisfied as long as enjoyment is 
not mercenary, Lewis, like Shaftesbury, fails to notice the limitations of 
enjoyment with reference to transcendence. 
The mercenary is one who does what is not enjoyable for the sake of what 
is. Mercenary behavior is instrumental, means-end behavior. Mercenary love 
is false love, as when a man loves a woman for her money or a woman loves 
a man for the security he provides. Disinterested behavior does not have this 
means-end structure, and disinterested love does not arise from ulterior mo-
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tives. When the Psalmist prays, "For God alone my soul in silence waits" 
(62.1), this can be a mercenary prayer meaning, "Only God can get me out 
of this mess," or it can be a disinterested prayer meaning, "Not even the 
benefits of divine grace, but only God in person can satisfy me." There is a 
huge difference between these two prayers, but in both cases the self is 
concerned with its own satisfaction, and the love that seeks to enjoy its object 
is caught up in its own enjoyment. 
It is Levinas who sees more clearly than anyone that the other enjoyed is 
not necessarily transcendent, and, consequently, that enjoyment is not neces-
sarily self-transcendence. Echoing the Hegelian formula we noted earlier, 
Levinas finds us not content merely to be at home with ourselves in familiar 
surroundings (his chez soi = Hegel's bei sich) but disposed to reach out 
"toward an alien outside-of-oneself, toward a yonder." He calls this desire for 
genuine otherness metaphysical desire. But the other thus desired "is not 'other' 
like the bread I eat, the land in which I dwell, the landscape I contemplate .. .1 
can 'feed' on these realities and to a very great extent satisfy myself, as though 
I had simply been lacking them. Their alterity is thereby reabsorbed into my own 
identity as a thinker or a possessor. The metaphysical desire tends toward some-
thing else entirely, toward the absolutely other" (1969: 33). 
As this passage indicates, eating is the paradigm of enjoyment and the 
source of the appearance of transcendence therein. Against all forms of ide-
alism, which interpret knowledge as the primacy of subject over object, the 
reduction of the latter's otherness to the sameness of the former, alimentation 
reminds me that I am a body within the world and not just a mind for whom 
the world is a spectacle. Food overflows its meaning as an object of repre-
sentation and becomes a condition for the very acts by which such meaning 
is constituted (127-30). In my dependence on the elements of life I seem to 
encounter something quite other than myself. 
Levinas makes three points about enjoyment so construed that are relevant 
to our project. First, as Shaftesbury and Lewis have noted, in enjoyment we 
are beyond self-interest conceived in instrumental or mercenary terms. "Here 
lies the permanent truth of hedonist moralities: to not seek, behind the satis-
faction of need, an order relative to which alone satisfaction would require 
a value; to take satisfaction, which is the very meaning of pleasure, as a term. 
The need for food does not have existence as its goal, but food. Biology 
teaches the prolongation of nourishment into existence; need is naive" (134). 
Second, enjoyment is pure egoism, not self-transcendence. "In enjoyment 
I am absolutely for myself. Egoist without reference to the Other, I am alone 
without solitude, innocently egoist and alone. Not against the Others, not 'as 
for me ... ' -but entirely deaf to the Other, outside of all communication and 
all refusal to communicate-without ears, like a hungry stomach" (134; his 
ellipsis). I may be dependent on the elements from which I draw my nour-
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ishment, but "in the satisfaction of need the alienness of the world that founds 
me loses its alterity ... Through labor and possession the alterity of nutriments 
enters into the same" (129). 
Finally, as the phrase 'like a hungry stomach' suggests, eating is but a 
model of many different modes of enjoyment. As "an ultimate relation with 
the substantial plenitude of being," enjoyment "embraces all relations with 
things" (133). I take this to mean not that there is nothing but enjoyment, but 
that there is no relation that cannot be elevated to/reduced to enjoyment. In 
spite of the initial distinction between knowledge and enjoyment, Levinas is 
explicit that cognitive relations can have this structure, especially when they 
have a contemplative character. Thus, "I but open my eyes and already enjoy 
the spectacle" (130). And we have already seen him assimilate "the landscape 
I contemplate" to "the bread I eat." The psalmist who thirsts for the face of 
God as a deer for streams of water (42: 1-2) has surely made spiritual progress 
over those whose only appetites are for "wine, women, and song." But the 
journey toward genuine religious experience may not be over. 
There is stilI another mode of self-forgetfulness that turns out to be some-
thing less than the self-transcendence we are seeking to clarify. Like contem-
plation it takes us beyond the mercenary, and it often turns up in religious 
contexts. We can call it ecstatic self-forgetfulness, as distinct from contem-
plative. The two are not totally different, for there surely is a contemplative 
ecstasy, for example, in Yoga. 
We can consider play, as interpreted by Gadamer, as something of a tran-
sition experience. Since he relates play to the religious festival and claims 
that "The player experiences the game as a reality that surpasses him" (110, 
97-98), there is obvious reference to our own question about religious expe-
rience. Even the spectator is able "to forget one's own purposes ... To be 
present...has a character of being outside oneself." This "ecstasy of being 
outside oneself [Ekstatik des Aussersichseins]" is "the positive possibility of 
being wholly with something else. This kind of being present is a self-for-
getfulness, and it is the nature of the spectator to give himself in self-forget-
fulness to what he is watching" (110-11; cf. 113-14). 
More sharply distinct from contemplative self-forgetfulness than Gadamer-
ian play is the Dionysian, as described by Nietzsche. It is not only a self-for-
getfulness by contrast with Apollinian self-knowledge; it also dwells among 
the "wilder emotions" from which Apollinian calm is free (1967: 45,35). Far 
from being any kind of spectator sport, it is a realm of Rausch (intoxication, 
delirium, frenzy, transport, ecstasy, rapture) and Verziickung (ecstasy, rapture, 
transport, trance, convulsion). In the "dancers of St. John and st. Vitus," in 
"the Bacchic choruses of the Greeks," and "as far back as Babylon and the 
orgiastic Sacaea," we find the Dionysian experience in which "everything 
subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness" (33-37). 
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There is clearly a dimension of self-transcendence here, even of detachment 
from self. But ecstatic self-forgetfulness is no more what we are looking for 
than was contemplative self-forgetfulness. Gadamer tells us as much himself 
when he writes, "Thus to the ecstatic self-forgetfulness of the spectator there 
corresponds his continuity with himself. Precisely that in which he loses 
himself as a spectator requires his own continuity ... the absolute moment in 
which a spectator stands is at once self-forgetfulness and reconciliation with 
self. That which detaches him from everything also gives him back the whole 
of his being" (1975: 113-14). 
This sounds so much like the words of Jesus (Mark 8: 35) that we might 
easily think we have found the definition of religious self-transcendence if 
Gadamer had not also said, in the middle of the passage just quoted, "It is 
the truth of [the spectator's] o~n world, the religious and moral world in 
which he lives, which presents itself to him and in which he recognizes 
himself." William James is said to have complained that for Josiah Royce 
"the world is real but not so very damn real." We might say here that the 
ecstatic self encounters something other than itself, but no so very damn 
other. In other words, though the elements on which the self feeds here are 
spiritual rather than physical, we have not gotten beyond the realm of nutri-
tion. Like its contemplative counterpart, ecstatic self-forgetfulness is a spe-
cies of enjoyment. 
That this is also true for Nietzsche's wilder version is perhaps clearest in 
his linkage of the Dionysian with sexual ecstasy (1967: 36; 1968: sec. 798-
801). I do not mean simply that sex is fun. What I have in mind is best 
expressed in the comment one of my students made to me years ago. After 
living together for a while, she and her boyfriend had broken up and sepa-
rated. Though she had no apparent scruples about having lived together, she 
was obviously not comfortable about the fact that they still secretly got 
together to have sex. Her explanation/excuse: "the only time I can ever forget 
myself is when I'm having sex." Her ex-boyfriend was "other but not so very 
damn other" because he was but an element through which her need was 
satisfied. That her need was primarily for oblivion rather than for pleasure 
or intimacy does not take her experience, or Nietzsche's Dionysian of which 
it is a model, beyond the framework of enjoyment. Self-forgetfulness contin-
ues to be a mode of being preoccupied with oneself, in this case with killing 
for oneself the pain of being oneself. 
Although we have not yet found the model that will clarify for us what is 
essential about the peculiar combination of transcendence and self-transcen-
dence which the Augustinian tradition offers as a normative concept of reli-
gious experience, the time has come to introduce our second major theme, 
self-deception. For it will throw light on our negative results to this point. 
Our point of departure can be the suspicion Nietzsche directs toward religious 
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experience, even that of religious founders. "One sort of honesty has been 
alien to all founders of religions and their kind: They have never made their 
experiences a matter of conscience for knowledge. 'What did I really expe-
rience?' ... None of them has asked such questions, nor do any of our dear 
religious people ask them even now" (1974: 253). 
Paul Ricoeur translates this kind of question into the language of the bib-
lical prophets on the warpath against idolatry as he introduces his own her-
meneutics of suspicion. "In our time we have not finished doing away with 
idols and we have barely begun to listen to symbols. It may be that this 
situation, in its apparent distress, is instructive: it may be that extreme icon-
oclasm belongs to the restoration of meaning" (1970: 27). To listen to reli-
gious symbols is to open oneself to a claim from what purports to be 
ultimately transcendent and to entertain the possibility of transcending one-
self in that direction. To do away with idols is to take seriously the suspicion 
that what purports to be listening to religious symbols is actually something 
quite different, an acoustic illusion in which my own voice is mistaken for 
the divine voice. When this occurs, religion becomes a disguised form of 
self-centering or preoccupation with oneself. For corresponding to false-con-
sciousness are false gods, and the deities who are the means or the elements 
for self-centering are wish-fulfilling projections whose fictitious character 
does not keep them from being rivals to whatever may be truly sacred (see 
Westphal, 1987). 
Ricoeur's suggestion is that the pursuit of any possibly genuine self-tran-
scendence must include a negative, iconoclastic moment. He calls us to renew 
the question that Jonathan Edwards put so sharply with reference to the "holy 
affections" in which "true religion, in great part, consists" (1959: 95)-how 
can we distinguish the truly holy affections from their counterfeit counter-
parts? Precisely our failure, to this point, to find an adequate model for the 
self-transcendence that constitutes genuine religious experience puts us in a 
good position to see why Nietzsche and Ricoeur and Edwards (like Amos and 
Jesus) refuse to take everything that offers itself as religious experience at 
face value. For that failure contains the transcendental deduction, so to speak, 
of three idols. 
To begin with, any religious experience that contents itself with what we 
have called intentional transcendence can be shown to be idolatrous. Religion 
that consists of nothing more than doctrinal knowledge of a transcendent 
creator and savior, for example, no matter how correct and orthodox such 
doctrine may be, reduces God to one of my clear and distinct ideas. Having 
already reduced the wholly other to the proposition ally possessed, it will 
complete itself as the instrumental religion in which the truth serves as a 
security blanket or a weapon against one's opponents and thus as an escape 
from the call to a decentered selfhood (see Westphal, 1980). 
180 Faith and Philosophy 
Similarly, insofar as religious experience can be adequately described in 
terms of either contemplative or ecstatic self-forgetfulness, its gods will be 
but vehicles of enjoyment, nutritional elements lacking the kind of transcen-
dence in themselves that would make them wholly and genuinely other or 
enable them to inspire any detachment from self. 
To call the gods of such religions idols is to recognize them as convenient 
fictions masked as transcendent realities. But the iconoclasm that labels them 
as such should not be misunderstood to be the claim that there is no place in 
true religion for doctrinal affirmation or for either contemplative or ecstatic 
self-forgetfulness. On the contrary, I want to insist that there is an important 
place for each of these in true religion. The point is that by themselves these 
moments do not make up the true religion we seek. Something is missing, 
something so essential that without it these important moments of true reli-
gion become the embodiment of false. What is it? 
There is an important clue in Gadamer's analysis of contemplative and 
ecstatic self-forgetfulness. Much as Lewis distinguishes the few who receive 
art from the many who use it, Gadamer emphasizes the "important difference 
between a spectator who gives himself entirely to the play of art, and someone 
who merely gapes at something out of curiosity." For the former "the play of 
art does not simply exhaust itself in the ecstatic emotion of the moment, but 
has a claim to permanence and the permanence of a claim" (1975: 111-12). 
We might take this talk about a claim in purely aesthetic terms, as if the 
work of art lays claim to be recognized as a classic. But Gadamer seems to 
have in mind something more nearly like the experience Rilke expresses in 
his sonnet, "Archaic Torso of Apollo." 
Never will we know his fabulous head 
where the eyes' apples slowly ripened. Yet 
his torso glows: a candelabrum set 
before his gaze which is pushed back and hid, 
restrained and shining. Else the curving breast 
could not thus blind you nor through the soft tum 
of the loins could this smile easily have passed 
into the bright groins where the genitals burned. 
Else stood this stone a fragment and defaced, 
with lucent body from the shoulders falling, 
too short, not gleaming like a lion's fell; 
nor would this star have shaken the shackles off, 
bursting with light, until there is no place 
that does not see you. You must change your life. 
(MacIntyre, 1957: 92-93) 
We are not prepared for these last five words, 'You must change your life.' 
Like the words, 'To live life to the end is no childish task' at the conclusion 
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of Doctor Zhivago, their claim upon us shatters the calm of contemplation 
and calls us beyond the realm of aesthetic enjoyment to ethical, even religious 
responsibility. For this reason Gadamer explicates his notion of the claim in 
terms of Kierkegaard's challenge to contemporaneity with Christ and to hear-
ing the proclamation of the gospel in a sermon, as understood by dialectical 
theology (1975: 112-13). His earlier notion that "the player experiences the 
game as a reality that surpasses him" (98), now becomes the notion that in 
the claim we encounter the "truth" of the "moral and religious world" in 
which we live (113). 
There is an ambiguity here. As a moral and religious claim, this truth seems 
to have the categorical character that would render it truly other. But, as Kant 
and Freud insist with the greatest clarity and persuasiveness, the voice of 
categorical claims may very well be our very own voice. And Gadamer 
himself qualifies the alterity of the claim by saying, with reference to the 
spectator, "It is the truth of his own world, the religious and moral world in 
which he lives, which presents itself to him and in which he recognizes himself 
(113, my italics). If the truth that claims me is simply the tradition that has 
already shaped me, the spiritual world in and from which I live, and move, 
and have my being, its voice is other but not so very damn other. If Gadamer 
wants us to take seriously his appeal to Kierkegaard and to dialectical theol-
ogy he must identify a claim that evokes fear and trembling not only from 
me as an existing individual hut from my established order as well 
(Kierkegaard, 1944: 89; Barth, 1968: 27-54). His lack of enthusiasm for such 
a task is notorious. 
For an unambiguous development of the clue we have found in Gadamer, 
the idea that it is in the form of a claim upon us that we encounter the 
otherness of the other, we can return to Levinas' account of metaphysical 
desire as directed toward "something else entirely, toward the absolutely 
other" (1969: 33). His analysis of enjoyment as involving self-centering 
rather than self-transcendence is one of several foils against which he devel-
ops the thesis that "the absolutely other is the Other" (39). 
Who is this Other? In the first instance it is the one whom I encounter face 
to face in conversation (39, 71). In other words, the Other is another human 
being. Because our encounter takes place in language, it can be no animal 
other, and because it takes place face to face it can be no divine other. Rather, 
"it is only man who could be absolutely foreign to me" (73; cf. 71-79). 
Secondly, the Other is the one whose face and speech I first encounter, 
beyond all knowing, all using, and all enjoying (38), as a claim, the uncon-
ditional constraint upon my freedom that leaves me fully free to accept or 
reject it and that is expressed in the words, "You shall not commit murder" 
(199,216,262,303). Only in the realm of ethics, only in "the ethical impos-
sibility of killing [the Other]" (87), do I encounter otherness as truly other. 
182 Faith and Philosophy 
This claim has a radically dec entering intent. "To welcome the Other is to 
put in question my freedom" (85; cf. 51,43). It reminds me that I am not the 
center to which all else is peripheral, the end to which all else is the means. 
In the claims of the Other I am suddenly beyond all objects to be known, all 
tools to be used, and all elements on which to feed either body or soul. 
What is worse, from the perspective of the "dear self," the relation is 
asymmetrical. It is not a prudent, contractual arrangement among equals in 
which I offer to spare your life (and liberty) if you agree to spare mine. On 
the one hand is the asymmetry of loftiness. The unconditional character of 
the Other's claim can only be expressed in images of height and authority. 
For this reason, although the Other is human and not divine, Levinas speaks 
of the Other as "Most-High" (34) and "Master" (72, 75, 86). On the other 
hand there is the asymmetry of indigence. This is why Levinas also refers to 
the Other as the stranger, the widow, the orphan, and the poor (77-78). The 
Other has nothing to offer in exchange for my welcoming, least of all a bribe. 
With such indigent loftiness it is impossible to negotiate or to strike a deal. 
Finally, the face of the Other "expresses itself," it manifests itself "kath' 
auto" (51). We are familiar with this Greek phrase through its Latin equiva-
lent, per se. The face of the other expresses itself, and it does so through 
itself and not through another. This does not consist in its being disclosed, 
"its being exposed to the gaze that would take it as a theme for interpretation, 
and would command an absolute position dominating the object. Manifesta-
tion kath' auto consists in a being telling itself to us independently of every 
position we would have taken in its regard, expressing itself' (65; cf. 67,74, 
77). 
The concept of disclosure that Levinas here contrasts with expression kath . 
auto or 'revelation' has Husserlian-Heideggerian connotations. "To recognize 
truth to be disclosure is to refer it to the horizon of him who discloses ... The 
disclosed being is relative to us and not kath' auto" (64). By contrast, the 
notion of the face as self-revelatory "brings us to a notion of meaning prior 
to my Sinngebung and thus independent of my initiative and my power" (51). 
Even more important, it is independent of the horizons of meaning we bring 
with us, the tacit dimensions of our awareness that confer meaning without 
our noticing it (28). 
Levinas knows exactly what he is doing here. He is claiming immediacy 
for the Other's self-expression. "The immediate is the face to face" (52). In 
spite of all attacks on the "myth of the given," he is claiming that the face is 
a theory free datum. In willful disregard for the alleged inescapability of the 
hermeneutical circle, he finds us pointed toward "the possibility of significa-
tion without a context" (23). And in spite of all attacks on the metaphysics 
of presence and the transcendental signifier (Derrida, 1976: 49-50, 69-71; 
1981: 19-20, 29, 44), he insists that "the signification of the face is due to 
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an essential coinciding of the existent and the signifier. Signification is not 
added to the existent. To signify is not equivalent to presenting oneself as a 
sign, but to expressing oneself, that is, presenting oneself in person" (262). 
Such claims are bold heresy in the present philosophical climate. But in 
spite of the avalanche of criticism they are bound to evoke, Levinas will want 
to stick by them, for they are the key to his project. Without self-expression 
kath' auto, I could not welcome the Other as such. The Other would be 
permitted to encounter me only as a meaning relative to my own (present) 
acts of Sinngebung or to the sedimented (past) acts of myself and of others 
that I bring with me as horizon, context, pre-understanding, a priori, tacit 
dimension, pre-judice. Since as thematizing and as operative intentionality I 
would be the condition of the possibility of her appearance, she would clearly 
be merely phenomenal. No per se, no an sich. Such an Other is not so very 
damn other. But as the claim that challenges my centrality in its own terms 
and not in my own, the Other is very other indeed. 
This is not the immediacy that ends up as pure indeterminacy (Hegel, 1969: 
82; cf. 1959: Par. 86). It is concerned with presence, to be sure, but not with 
sheer presence beyond difference. It is Derrida, pursuing his own agenda of 
difjirance, who points this out. By virtue of the lofty majesty attributed by 
Levinas to the Other, the encounter with the Other "does not take the form 
of an intuitive contact" since the Other is present "not as a total presence but 
as a trace" (Derrida, 1978: 95). What we have here is "absolute proximity 
and absolute distance ... A community of nonpresence, and therefore of non-
phenomenality ... Only the other, the totally other, can be manifested ... within 
a certain nonmanifestation and a certain absence ... 1t can be said only of the 
other that its phenomenon is a certain non phenomenon, a certain absence" 
(90-91, my italics). 
This is why Levinas sometimes speaks of the Other simply as "the Stranger 
who disturbs the being at home with oneself" (1969: 39). Without the addi-
tional appellations of widow, orphan, and poor, such a reference evokes 
Camus rather than the Law and the Prophets and serves to make it clear that 
the Other, when encountered as truly other, is an intangible intrusion and not 
an intuitive intelligibility. It is for the same reason that Levinas emphasizes 
the nudity of the face. This is not to deny that the face may be the bearer of 
cultural codes, as when an expensive coiffure, a matted beard, or the unmis-
takable signs of Downs syndrome enable me to assign faces to their places 
in the social hierarchy. It is simply to deny that the meaning and validity of 
the Other's claim, "You shall not commit murder," is in any way dependent 
on these cultural codes. The ethical immediacy of the Other as face has 
nothing to do with pre-predicative indeterminacy; it is rather a matter of 
expressing a claim unmediated by the cultural codes that normally censor all 
claims. 
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The face as the presence of the Other as absolutely other "is produced 
concretely as a temptation to total negation, and as the infinite resistance to 
murder .. .in the hard resistance of these eyes without protection-what is 
softest and most uncovered" (262). If Camus' The Stranger renders uncom-
fortably concrete this "temptation to total negation," the death of the black 
man, Christmas, in Faulkner's Light in August reveals "the infinite resistance 
to murder .. .in ... these eyes without protection." A white lynch mob is deter-
mined to kill him, in spite of the testimony of the preacher, Hightower, that, 
"He was here that night. He was with me the night of the murder, I swear to 
God-" Grimm, their leader, finally corners Christmas, fires five shots into 
him, and, as he lies dying, castrates him. The others catch up. "But the man 
on the floor had not moved. He just lay there, with his eyes open and empty 
of everything save consciousness ... For a long moment he looked up at them 
with peaceful and unfathomable and unbearable eyes. Then his face, body, 
all, seemed to collapse, to fall in upon itself, and from out of the slashed 
gannents about his hips and loins the pent black blood seemed to rush like a 
released breath ... upon that black blast the man seemed to rise soaring into 
their memories forever and ever. They are not to lose it, in whatever peaceful 
valleys, beside whatever placid and reassuring streams of old age, in the 
mirroring faces of whatever children they will contemplate old disasters and 
newer hopes. It will be there, musing, quiet, steadfast, not fading and not 
parti<;ularly threatful, but of itself alone serene, of itself alone triumphant" 
(1950: 406-407). 
From out of the gaze of that black face the whole body of Christmas 
becomes face, so much so that the black blood that gushes from between his 
legs is transformed into a breath exuding from that face. According to the 
cultural codes that are the horizon for white perceptions of that black face, 
it is possible to interpret this killing, in spite of the victim's humanity, as 
equivalent to slaughtering a hog, and simultaneously, in spite of the victim's 
innocence, as a just punishment. If that were the whole story, it would be 
possible to forget the deed. But those who were there cannot do so, because 
the face of Christmas, against all the operative cultural codes, expresses 
unambiguously and unforgettably a claim that they could reject but not refute, 
"You shall not commit murder." 
They can kill him, but they cannot reify him. They cannot reduce his 
otherness to an object of their knowledge, a tool for their use, or nourishment 
for their enjoyment. Helpless and humiliated, defeated and dying, he embod-
ies a transcendence unlike any they have ever encountered in church. For the 
gods they worship are idols, but Christmas is "wholly other." 
Here we have the model we have been seeking to help us clarify the 
Augustinian notion of self-transcendence. This is an Other whose transcen-
dence consists in an unconditional claim that removes me from the center of 
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the universe both ethically by constraining my will and epistemologically by 
refusing to be constrained by the cultural codes of the world in which I 
recognize myself. 
This is the double dec entering that constitutes Augustine's double conver-
sion in Books VII and VIII of the Confessions. That independence of 
cultural codes precludes any account of knowledge as recollection is not 
only the argument of Augustine's critique of Platonism in Book VII, but 
also, and in greater detail, of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling and Phil-
osophical Fragments, taken jointly. Levinas reprises this argument by 
sharply distinguishing the ethical, in which I encounter the Other as truly 
other, from the political, in which I do not, and by repudiating recollection 
repeatedly as the vehicle of the ethical (1969: 21-24, 43, 51, 61, 171, 180, 
204). According to Derrida's apt summary, Levinas sees western philoso-
phy as "dominated since Socrates by a Reason which receives only what 
it gives itself, a Reason which does nothing but recall itself to itself." In 
this way "it has always neutralized the other, in every sense of the word" 
(Derrida, 1978: 96; cf. n. 27). 
What here separates ethics from politics is what joins it to religion. Thus 
Kierkegaard's tight linkage in the Postscript of ethics and religion as the 
life-world of subjectivity, totally different from that of aesthetic-speculative 
objectivity, finds its echo in Levinas's claim that true religion presupposes 
ethics (77-78). We cannot truly love God while hating our sister and brother 
(1 John 4:40). If Marcel and Merton are the great Catholic Augustinians of 
our time, and Kierkegaard the great Protestant Augustinian, Levinas is the 
great Jewish Augustinian. 
The Other whose transcendence Levinas has helped us to specify provides 
us with the opportunity for a unique self-transcendence. To welcome an Other 
so unwelcome to the pride that the Augustinian tradition finds to be the heart 
of our darkness and the darkness of our heart is to become a new person 
indeed. We are, of course, still in the realm of ethics and not yet talking about 
religious experience. For this Other is human and not divine. But all we have 
to do is replace the human with the divine Other to have the normative 
concept of religious experience we are looking for. Genuine religious expe-
rience is the self-transcendence in relation to a divine transcendence that 
radically decenters us as will, and, correspondingly, as belief and affection. 
Perhaps this link between the ethical and the religious is the truth behind 
Kant's claims that "morality does not need religion at all," that "morality 
leads inevitably to religion," and that "Religion is (subjectively regarded) the 
recognition of all duties as divine commands" (1960: 3, 7n., 142). 
It is now possible to specify just where a couple of earlier formulations 
that looked so promising came up short. Gadamer's account of ecstatic self-
forgetfulness in play, art, and religious ritual culminates in these words-
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"That which detaches him from everything also gives him back the whole of 
his being" (1975: 113-14). These words evoked for us the claim of Jesus that 
only those who lose their life will find it. But what Jesus says is this-"who-
ever loses his life for my sake and the gospel's will save it" (Mark 8:35, my 
italics). 
Who is this Jesus, and what is this "gospel of Jesus Christ" (Mark 1: 1)7 
Jesus is the one who has just responded to Peter's "You are the Messiah" with 
the announcement, to be repeated on two subsequent occasions (9:30-32, 
10:32-34, cf. 45), that far from being the Davidic warrior who has come to 
slay the pharisaical-scribal Goliath of the Galilean synagogue, or the priestly 
Goliath of the Jerusalem temple, or the imperial Goliath of Rome, he is the 
Human One who must suffer arid die at the hands of these Goliaths. And the 
good news about him centers in the call to a discipleship of self-denial and 
joining him on the way of the cross (8:34). By leaving out the crucial words, 
"for my sake and the gospel's," Gadamer leaves out precisely that decentering 
of the self as will (to power, cf. 10:35-45) that distinguishes the Markan 
account of self-transcendence as losing and finding oneself. 
Similarly, we can now identify what C. S. Lewis failed to say when he 
wrote, "Heaven offers nothing that a mercenary soul can desire. It is safe to 
tell the pure in heart that they shall see God, for only the pure in heart want 
to" (1962: 144-45). His glosses on this claim, you will recall, were in terms 
of love as enjoyment of the object of desire. In order to get beyond the 
self-referential character of enjoyment, we need to specify that the pure in 
heart are precisely those who have learned to welcome Mark's Jesus as their 
center. It is safe to tell them of the "pie in the sky" that consists in seeing 
God not simply because they want to see God. For the God some want to see 
is an idol, the cosmic legitimizer and guarantor of their own will to power 
(Peter in Mark 8-"Get behind me, Satan," James and John in Mark 10, the 
crowd on Palm Sunday). Rather, it is safe to tell them that they shall see God 
because their purity of heart consists in willing the one thing they cannot will 
from the center-
Hallowed be Thy name 
Thy kingdom come 
Thy will be done 
The enjoyment of God known to such pure hearts is authentic self-transcen-
dence, and the God enjoyed is genuinely transcendent. Transcendence is an 
ethical category relating to the will, not an ontological category relating to 
being. 
A normative concept of religious experience defined in terms of welcoming 
Mark's Jesus and learning to pray the prayer of his kingdom may seem too 
specific, even sectarian, to define religious as distinct from Christian expe-
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rience. But the generic character of the concept is not compromised by the 
concreteness of the tradition through which it has been introduced. It is, for 
example, not difficult to show that the Brahman of the Hindu tradition and 
the Nirvana of the Buddhist tradition are wholly other in the sense we 
have now identified, for they confront me as an ethical claim that in both 
its ascetic and altruistic dimensions defines the false self as the will to be 
the center. 
It would seem, then, that the concept of self-transcendence is useful 
beyond the biblical framework used here to render it concrete. It focuses 
attention on the ubiquitous challenge of religion to autonomous selfhood. 
It is not the task of this essay to spell out in detail the differences and 
similarities that emerge as the concept is employed across the spectrum of 
religious phenomena. 
Rather the question is whether this generic concept of genuine religious 
self-transcendence takes us beyond the dangers of religious self-deception? 
Will it no longer be necessary to ask Nietzsche's question, "What did I really 
experience?" 
Let us make the question even more concrete, returning to the tradition 
we know best. Suppose I am Thomas a Kempis, and that I offer the following 
prayer in all sincerity. "0 Lord, Thou knowest what is the better way, let this 
or that be done, as Thou shalt please. Give what Thou wilt, and how much 
Thou wilt, and when Thou wilt. Deal with me as Thou knowest, and as best 
plea seth Thee, and is most for Thy honour. Set me where Thou wilt, and deal 
with me in all things just as Thou wilt. I am in Thy hand: tum me round, and 
tum me back again, even as a wheel. Behold, I am Thy servant, prepared for 
all things; for I desire not to live unto myself, but unto Thee; and 0 that I 
could do it worthily and perfectly" (1900: 127). Can we be confident that this 
prayer is offered to a truly transcendent God, rather than an idol, and that the 
prayer belongs to an experience of genuine self-transcendence? 
Unfortunately not. We have already stipulated that these words are sincere. 
We can further stipulate that their sincerity is attested by the appropriate 
deeds. Our Thomas lives, let us say, an exemplary life of poverty, chastity, 
and obedience. Still, we will be reminded, "However painstaking our work, 
so long as we omit to surrender ourselves to God while performing it...our 
efforts build up within us not so much a true spirit of grace but the spirit of 
a Pharisee" (Chariton, 1966: 137). But how could such words and deeds fail 
to express a dec entering surrender of oneself to God? 
The answer is simple. Sincerity is no guarantee against self-deception. 
Corresponding to the three idols whose transcendental deduction we noted 
earlier are three modes of religious experience which do not even have the 
form of true godliness, decentering self-transcendence. This piety, by con-
trast, has that form so conspicuously that it could be used as its paradigm. 
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But that form may still be but appearance not supported by the reality it 
professes. Our Thomas may unconsciously be a hypocrite. 
To see how this is possible let us recall The Total Woman. Perhaps like me 
you feel you have read this book even though you haven't. It suggests that 
the way to happiness for a woman is to subordinate herself entirely to the 
happiness of her lord and master. No, not God, but her husband. The combi-
nation of the theological claim that a radically hierarchical relation should 
exist between husband and wife with an emphasis on the wife's responsibility 
to keep the husband both sexually stimulated and satisfied, led Martin Marty 
to summarize his review in four words: fundies in their undies. Some years 
ago a student of mine wrote a review of this book which revealed the manip-
ulative character of this conspicuous subordination. Again and again the book 
said, in so many words, Treat your husband as your lord and master and he'll 
be yours. You'll have no trouble keeping him for yourself or getting him to 
do what you want. You'll be in control. 
The life of the total woman has the form of decentering self-transcendence, 
but not the substance. She may sincerely hold the beliefs and feel the emo-
tions that her idea calls for, and she may perform a lifetime of sacrificial 
service for her husband. But this does not keep her from being self-deceived 
about what she has experienced, nor does it keep her devotion from being 
manipulative. What appears to her as subordination and service is in fact a 
complex web of strategic action in the service of her will to power. Secretly, 
and she keeps this secret even from herself, she is the center of her world. 
Exactly the same may be true of our saintly Thomas it Kempis. The form 
of his piety is that of a decentering self-transcendence. Its inner content may 
or may not correspond. The form is visible, to others and to him. The content 
may be hidden from both. If it does not correspond and if he has managed 
not to notice this, he is self-deceived and the god he serves, so far from being 
genuinely transcendent, is not only constituted by his intentionality but also 
constructed by his (hidden) intentions. Such a god, so far from being "wholly 
other," is not so very damn other at all. 
Given the multiple possibilities for self-deception, perhaps we can now 
see why self-transcendence is the task of a lifetime and why genuine 
transcendence is so elusive. And perhaps the current preoccupation with 
alterity among some philosophers is more the expression of hunger than 
of curiosity. 
I want to suggest two conclusions for the philosophy of religion that seem 
to me to follow from these reflections. If this essay were addressed primarily 
to pastors or spiritual directors, I would address a very practical issue at this 
point. While the foregoing has shown, I hope, the need for suspicion and 
self-examination (since suspicion reduced to a tool for unmasking others 
becomes thereby a tool for sustaining our own self-deceptions), it has not 
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mentioned the dangers this entails, dangers of morbidity, masochism, and 
cynicism. Since I do not want to draw too sharp a line between the pastoral 
and the philosophical, the therapeutic and the theoretical, I pause at least long 
enough to mention these issues. 
But the two conclusions with which I want to conclude concern philosophy 
as theory. It may seem as if our phenomenological reflections have ignored 
one of the most intensely debated philosophical questions relating to re-
ligious experience, namely whether it can provide good reasons to support 
religious beliefs. But this is not so. Instead, the account of religious expe-
rience we have developed together would seem to place a major obstacle in 
the way of any positive answer to this question we might seek to develop. 
Our normative concept suggests that the intentional object of religious ex-
perience that lacks either the form or the substance of true godliness will be 
an idol of one sort or another. Such experience can hardly provide rational 
support for beliefs that purport to express the genuine transcendence of the 
truly divine. For religious experience to have any evidential value, it will 
first have to be shown to be authentic. 
There are perhaps two reasons why this task has been conspicuously absent 
from most discussions. One is its obvious difficulty. The other is the principle 
of charity, the tendency to consider religious experience innocent until proven 
guilty. But neither of these is a good reason. An essential task becomes less 
essential because of its difficulty only in the presence of self-deceptive lazi-
ness. And no matter how wonderfully American it may sound, the innocent-
until-proven-guilty principle simply ignores 1) the biblical claim that "the 
heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately corrupt" (Jer. 17:9), 2) the 
powerful theoretical analyses, only briefly developed in this essay, of self-
deception whenever self-transcendence is at issue, and 3) our own "thou art 
the man" experience in the presence of such analyses. 
One way to put this point would be to say that religious experience cannot 
provide any evidence for truth as objectivity until it has passed the test of 
truth as subjectivity. This link between the hermeneutics of suspicion and 
questions of inwardness and authenticity leads to a second conclusion. It puts 
in question the wisdom of doing business as usual within the religious epis-
temology industry. No doubt reflection is and ought to be ancilLa vitae. But 
when the philosophy of religion, on this issue or any other, so focuses on 
objectivity as to let issues of subjectivity get forgotten or rendered peripheral, 
it shows itself to be ancillary to the life of some objectivist culture, Hegelian, 
positivist, technocratic, or whatever, that is systematically prejudiced against 
religious experience in general and the life of Christian faith in particular. 
This fact, if it is indeed a fact, is deserving of more attention than it usually 
gets among Christians in philosophy. 
Fordham University 
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NOTES 
*This essay is derived from two lectures given at the annual Wheaton College Philos-
ophy Conference in October of 1989. 
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